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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
SECURITIES LAWS: HAVE THINGS
CHANGED SINCE ENRON?
James D. Cox* and Randall S. Thomast
with the Assistance of Dana Kiku $
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. securities laws seek to fulfill a variety of social objectives. 1 The most obtuse of them is allocational efficiency. Mandatory
disclosure requirements for public offerings facilitates the allocation
of scarce capital directly among competing investment opportunities
and periodic disclosure does so indirectly through its impact on investors' decisions with respect to the array of risk-return relationships
that compete for their savings. Mandatory disclosure also reduces the
frequency and magnitude of fraud thus reducing the risk and losses to
investors. Furthermore, the greater transparency provided by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure requirements is believed to reduce agency costs on the part of managers. Greater
transparency not only protects investor-owners, but also contributes
positively to efficient deployment of firm resources.
The mechanisms for mandatory disclosure under the U.S. securities laws are well understood. Disclosure is mandated episodically for
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I

See generally INT'L

ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURI-

4.1 (1998) (setting forth three core objectives of securities regulation-protection of investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and
transparent; and reduction of systematic risk), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.
RICHorg/publicsector/legal/Objectives&Principles%20for%2OSecurities%Reg.doc;
TIES REGULATION §

ARD W. JENNINGS

ET

AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1-6 (8th ed. 1998) (discussing con-

sumer protection, informational needs of investors, allocative efficiency, corporate
governance and "agency costs," economic growth innovation, and access to capital);
Joel Seligman, The HistoricalNeed for a Mandatory CorporateDisclosure System, 9J. CORP.
L. 1, 9 (1983) (explaining five principal arguments to justify the securities regulation
system).
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such events as public offerings, 2 proxy solicitations, 3 and tender offers. 4 Most public companies also face periodic disclosure requirements. 5 Less formal requirements for disclosure arise by virtue of
disclosure obligations anchored in the antifraud provision, such as the
duty to update. 6 These extensive disclosure requirements are backed
up by a reasonably well-funded government agency, the SEC, as well as
express and implied causes of actions for private litigants. 7 Thus, a
company manifesting anything less than undying obeisance to compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements must confront the possibility of a less than genteel encounter with the staff of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement and/or the private class action attorney.
America is unique not only in the governmental funds it commits to
the enforcement of its securities laws, but also in the extent that private suits for alleged violations occur. The latter is not the product of
rumored greater litigiousness of the U.S. citizens, but most likely reflects the effects of collateral legal rules such as the "American Rule"
respecting parties' responsibility for attorneys fees, the availability of
contingent fees, and, of course, the class action.
So robust is the securities class action that with great confidence
the attorney can advise her client that one is far more likely to encounter the plaintiffs' securities class action lawyer than SEC enforcement personnel. This observation raises a wide range of questions
2 See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
3 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); Exchange Act
Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2004).
4 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) (1),
78n (d) (1). 5 The companies so subject to the requirements are those falling within section
12(a) or 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a), (g), which for domestic issuers requires annual and quarterly reporting and sometimes relatively
prompt reporting of certain events required to be disclosed on Form 8-K. See also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (setting forth the requirements
and mechanisms for periodic reporting).
6 See, e.g., Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding
that there is a duty to disclose material change in financial limits on debt that would
be required by a forthcoming acquisition). Even broader than the duty to update is
the case law surrounding half-truths, which imposes a duty to disclose so as to avoid
having what has been represented not to be materially misleading in light of what has
not been disclosed. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Half Truths: ProtectingMistaken
Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REv. 87 (1999) (examining the half-truth
doctrine of securities law in the context of the half-truth doctrine that exists in the
common law of fraud).
7 See generallyJAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS chs. 12-13 (4th ed. 2004) (reviewing the SEC's enforcement authority and the
scope of private actions under the antifraud provision).
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which we seek to answer in this Article. Foremost among our questions is the overall effectiveness of the public and private enforcement
efforts. Given the doubts raised about the.quality of American corporate governance practices after the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and
other subsequent corporate disasters, this is a particularly timely issue.
We address this question by gathering evidence on how those corporations that have been the targets of SEC enforcement efforts compare in terms of their size and financial health vis-A-vis firms that are
targeted only by the private securities class action. Related to this inquiry is whether the SEC or the private bar systematically proceeds
against violators that cause the greatest loss to investors. As to the
latter inquiry, we are intrigued by the most basic questions posed by
private suits: whether settlements bear any relationship to the losses
suffered by the class and whether those losses bear any relationship to
the size of either the firm itself or the duration of the class action.
The data examined below is expanded beyond that in our earlier
study contrasting the profiles of firms that are the subject of SEC enforcement actions with firms that are prosecuted through a private
class action suit.8 The evidence presented below provides additional
insight into the social welfare implications of SEC enforcement
heuristics as well as the overall performance of the securities class
action.
I.

METHODOLOGY

Our data set consists of 389 securities class action settlements that
occurred between 1990 and 2003. For this data set, we obtained from
the Compustat database certain financial information, discussed below, regarding the companies that were the defendants in the settled
securities class actions. We then reviewed the Enforcement Releases
on the SEC's website as well as conducting a search of the Lexis-Nexis
database. From these searches, we identified seventy-three cases, or
nineteen percent of our sample, that had a parallel SEC enforcement
action challenging the same conduct that was the subject of the private suit.
A central reference point in our assessment of the effectiveness of
SEC or private enforcement actions is to compare the dollar amount
of the relief obtained from the defendants with the estimated "prova8 SeeJames D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DuKE L.J. 737 (2003) (presenting a study compiled with the assistance of
Dana Kiku). Our earlier study included about forty percent fewer settlements than
the present study, and we have since expanded our database to include settlements
that extend into 2003.
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ble losses" their violation has caused investors. The standard measure
of damages for securities class actions is the difference between the
price at which the investors purchased or sold the security and what
that price would have been but for the misrepresentation. We refer to
this as the "provable loss" for the class. Because the defendant is responsible only for the harm it has caused by its misrepresentation,
other events and forces that affect the securities price must be removed from the calculus for measuring the provable loss. To do this,
we use the familiar market model to construct a "true-value line" for
each of the 389 settlements in our database.
The market model holds:
= ai +/3 R, + E,
where Rt is the return of a stock on day i for time period t, R,, is the
return of a market index for time period t, ai is the asset specific intercept, fPi
is the observed correlation of the individual return of security
i, and j,,is the so-called error term which is that portion of the stock
return that cannot be explained by market-wide events.
We have used the Equal-Weighted Market Index provided by the
Center for Research Securities Prices as our market index. To determine the individual security's /, we used data on individual stock
prices for a two-year period ending six months before the commencement of the class action period. We terminated our /3 calculations six
months before the commencement of the class action period because
our data sample consistently reflected abnormal stock price behavior
in the three-to-six month period before the commencement of the
class period. Using the market model, we estimated the unexplained
return, Eit.

We then derived the true value line by using our estimates of /l
and E and going backward in time beginning with the company's
stock price the day after the close of the class action period (the security's market price in response to disclosure of truthful information). 9
After that we calculated the difference between the actual market
price and the true value line at each point during the class period.
The next step toward measuring the provable losses for the class
is to determine how to weigh these losses by estimating the trading
that occurred during the class action period. Here there are two well9
ages,

See generally Harindra de Silva et al., Securities Act Violations: Estimation of Damin LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK:

ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT AS EXPERT WIT-

NESS ch. 44 (Roman L. Weil et al. eds., 1995); Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan,

UsingFinance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraudon the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV.
883, 888 (1990) (evaluating the market model approach to measuring damages and
analyzing the legal questions raised by the approach).
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10
accepted approaches-the one-trader and the two-trader models.
The one-trader model assumes that each share within the class period
has an equal probability of being traded at a given time during the
class period. Thus, on any given day during the class period, the
shares that are sold are drawn randomly from all outstanding shares
so that the resulting class is made up of shares that have not been
traded since acquired in the class period and those that were acquired
from others who purchased the securities within the class period. The
two-trader model divides investors into two sets according to their
probable trading propensities. One set is high-active traders and the
other is low-active traders. We assume low-active traders hold about
63% of the shares and account for 17% of the trading, so that highactive traders hold 37% of the shares and account for 83% of the trading. 1 ' These models, because they make different assumptions regarding to the magnitude of in-and-out trading, yield quite different
provable damage estimates. Because we believe that the two-trader
model's assumptions are more consistent with observed market behavior, we use it in estimating provable losses.

II.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In our earlier work, we examined the overlap between securities
fraud class actions filed solely by private plaintiffs and those class actions which accompany SEC enforcement actions. 12 We found that
only about 15% of settled private actions in our sample of pre-2002
cases had accompanying SEC enforcement actions. In matters where
both the SEC and private plaintiffs filed cases concerning the same
alleged misconduct, the private plaintiffs recovered statistically significantly larger recoveries in cases that settled more rapidly than those
class actions where the private plaintiffs proceeded alone. Several
other important results emerged: (1) the SEC targeted statistically significantly smaller market capitalization companies than private plaintiffs who filed actions in matters which the government did not
pursue; and (2) the SEC's choice of enforcement targets was best predicted by indicators of financial distress, while measures of provable
losses, asset size, and length of class period did not appear to influ10 See generally Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 491, 496-97 (1996) (explaining the one-trader and twotrader models).
11 We use data provided by MARCIA KRAMER MAYER, NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH AsSOCS., BEsT-FIT ESTIMATION OF DAMAGE VOLUME IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS: THE
MULTI-SECTOR, MULTI-TRADER MODEL OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR (2000), available at

http://www.nera.com/Publication.asp?p-ID=924.
12 Cox & Thomas, supra note 8.
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ence the SEC's decision over which companies to pursue in enforcement cases.
Descriptive Statistics and Bi-Variate Analysis

A.

In this paper, we have expanded our sample to include a larger
number of class action settlements including many that occurred after
2001. More specifically, we now have a sample of 389 securities fraud
class actions. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the entire

sample.
TABLE

1.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE

SeteIn Am

Jno
Private AcIon (mIIill ionIs o dollars)
Mean Median Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action

11.5

5.3

316

With a parallel SEC action

23.6

8.0

73

Total Sample

13.8

5.7

389

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action

1955.6

219.0

286

With a parallel SEC action

4931.9

202.0

66

Total Sample

2513.6

216.6

352

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action

11.7

9.0

316

With a parallel SEC action

17.7

15.7

73

Total Sample

12.8

10.5

389

TIn to RahSttlementIi (months)
Mean Median Number of observations
26.3

312

Without a parallel SEC action

29.0

With a parallel SEC action

27.1

23.7

72

Total Sample

28.6

25.5

384

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action

11.8%

6.1%

316

With a parallel SEC action

16.2%

6.5%

73

Total Sample

12.7%

6.1%

389

For the sample as a whole, what we see is that class actions without parallel SEC actions result in lower average (median) settlements,
are brought against on average (but not median) smaller market capi-
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talization companies, have shorter average (median) class periods,
and take longer on average (median) to reach settlement.1 3 These
results are similar to those in our earlier paper with the exception of
the average market capitalization comparisons, which show a large reversal (although the median values do not).
We also added to this table statistics on the ratio of absolute settlement amount to estimated provable losses. We see that the average
ratio of settlement amount to provable losses is higher for private actions with parallel SEC actions, but that the median values are roughly
the same. The differences in the median values are statistically
insignificant.
However, these average values may conceal changes that have occurred in recent years after the collapse of Enron and ensuing corporate governance reforms. In particular, our data set permits us to
determine if the SEC's approach to enforcement has changed during
the post-Enron period. To examine this issue, we split our sample
into pre-January 1, 2002, and post-January 1, 2002 (the divide being
roughly one month after the Enron bankruptcy), and compare the
two sub-samples. Tables 2 and 3 present these statistics.
Our data for the pre-2002 period for our expanded sample show
very similar patterns to those in our earlier paper. We see that private
suits that are filed against companies without parallel SEC enforcement actions result in smaller settlements, target larger companies,
have shorter class periods, and are slightly slower to settle. Moreover,
if we look at the ratio of settlement to provable losses, we see that
private suits without parallel SEC enforcement proceedings recover a
lower percentage of losses.
When we test for the significance of these differences, we find
that median market capitalization and median settlement-to-provablelosses ratios are statistically different across the two sub-samples at the
10% level of significance. The difference in median class periods is
statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 3 sets forth similar data on the settlements in our sample
that occurred afterJanuary 1, 2002. We see a different pattern in the
settlements during this time period.
The settlement amount data show a dramatic increase in the size
of settlements in private actions where the SEC has also filed an en13

The differences of the medians of the settlement amount and class period

across the two sub-samples are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.
The other bi-variate comparative tests are statistically insignificant. Throughout the
Article, we test the median differences for significance because of the presence of
large outliers in the data.
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SETTLEMENTS
PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 2002

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action
With a parallel SEC action

10.1
11.5

5.0
6.6

248
52

Total Sample

10.3

5.5

300

Mean

Median

Number of observations

1789.9

196.9

229

692.8

134.9

48

1599.7

184.8

277

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action
With a parallel SEC action

Total Sample

Without a parallel SEC action

11.2

9.0

248

With a parallel SEC action

15.4

12.9

52

Total Sample

12.0

9.6

300

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action

27.1

24.1

244

With a parallel SEC action

26.1

23.1

51

Total Sample

26.9

23.8

Ratio of Se ttlement A1munt to Provable

295

(%)

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action

12.3%

6.6%

248

With a parallel SEC action

20.8%

8.3%

52

Total Sample

13.8%

7.1%

300

forcement case. During this time period, we see that the size of the
average settlements shown in private suits with parallel SEC cases are
more than triple those where there is a private class action alone,
while the median values are almost triple. The difference in the medians is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. If we compare these values with those in the pre-January 1, 2002, cases shown in
Table 2, we see that the average settlement size increased for both
categories but this increase was much larger for private cases with parallel SEC filings. The median values show little change for private
suits alone over the two time periods, but a very large increase in median settlements for private suits with parallel SEC proceedings.
Within the group of cases with a parallel SEC action, the difference in
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SETTLEMENTS
AFTER JANUARY 1, 2002

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action

16.6

5.6

68

With a parallel SEC action
Total Sample

53.7

16.0

21

25.4

7.1

89

Mean
Without a parallel SEC action
With a parallel SEC action
Total Sample

Median

Number of observations

2621.3

584.5

57

16,236.4

1806.0

18

5889.0

806.6

75

Cliss. Perid (moths)
Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action
With a parallel SEC action

13.5

9.068

23.3

20.6

21

Total Sample

15.8

12.7

89

Mean

Median

Number of observations

Without a parallel SEC action

35.8

30.2

68

With a parallel SEC action
Total Sample

29.4
34.3

24.9
28.7

21
89

Ratioof
Sttlemnt Aount to Provable Lse %
Mean
Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action

10.2%

4.3%

68

With a parallel SEC action

4.8%

2.4%

21

Total Sample

8.9%

4.0%

89

the medians of the settlement amount across the pre-January 1, 2002,
and post-January 1, 2002, sub-samples is statistically significant at the
1% level.
Similarly striking changes occurred in the average market capitalization of defendant firms. If we compare the post-January 1, 2002,
cases with those for the earlier time period, we see that average market capitalization more than tripled in the latter period. Median comparisons over time show an even more pronounced quadrupling in
market capitalization, rising from 185 million to 807 million in the
post-2001 period.
More importantly, the SEC appears to be targeting much larger
companies during the post-January 1, 2002, period than it did in the
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earlier time frame. Average market capitalization for SEC enforcement targets was more than twenty-three times bigger in the post-January 1, 2002, time period than in the earlier period, while the median
market capitalization went up by a multiple of over thirteen times.
These differences are significant at all conventional levels.
This large increase in the size of SEC targets carries over to comparisons with the size of defendant firms of private class actions alone.

As we saw in Table 2, in the pre-January 1, 2002, time period, private
actions without parallel SEC proceedings targeted larger companies
than those with parallel SEC proceedings. In the post-January 1, 2002,
time frame, this pattern reverses: average market capitalization of
firms subject to both private and SEC actions is more than six times
greater than for firms that are the subject only to private actions. A
similar but less pronounced pattern is observed in the median data.
The median differences in firm size are statistically significant at the
10% level.
Both the length of class period and the time to reach settlement
increase in the post-2001 cases, although the relative comparisons between cases with SEC parallel actions and those without remain the
same. Average class period length, a proxy of the number of investors
that may have been affected by fraud, increases from twelve months in
the pre-January 1, 2002, period to sixteen months in the post-January
1, 2002, period. The shift is even greater for companies with parallel
SEC proceedings, as mean class period increases from fifteen months
in Table 2 to twenty-three months in Table 3. Similar patterns are
visible in the time to settlement data, although the increase for private
actions alone is larger than that for private actions with parallel SEC
cases.
Finally, if we look at the ratio of settlement amount to provable
losses, we see that the pattern in Table 2 of greater percentage recoveries in private actions with parallel SEC actions has reversed itself in
the post-January 1, 2002, data shown in Table 3. AfterJanuary 1, 2002,
the average ratio of settlement amounts to provable losses for private
cases with parallel SEC proceedings drops from 20.8% to 4.8%, while
the median ratio declines from 8.3% to 2.4%. These changes are statistically significant at the 1% level. Given the large increase in the
dollar settlements for the cases with parallel SEC actions, there must
have been a very big jump in the amount of provable losses in these
cases, probably because the companies involved are much larger and

2005]

HAVE THINGS

CHANGED

SINCE

ENRON?

the class periods somewhat longer.' 4 Private actions that do not have
accompanying SEC actions show a smaller decrease in average and
median levels for this ratio.
B.

MultivariateAnalysis of Settlement Amounts

Our next step is to see if we can explain the size of dollar settlements using our data. In this section, we use multivariate regression
analysis to determine what factors influence the size of settlements.
As our dependent variable, we use a logarithmic transformation of the
dollar amount of the settlement paid in each case. For independent
variables, we look at the length of the class period in months, the log
of provable losses, the log of total assets, a measure of financial distress, and a dummy variable for the presence of an SEC enforcement
15
action.
Our independent variables are defined as follows. First, we include a measure of provable losses for each private action. We calculate these values using the damage model that was discussed above.
Provable losses are a measure of the losses that investors suffered as a
result of the company's alleged fraud. Our hypothesis in this set of
regressions is that larger provable losses should increase the size of
the dollar settlement. We therefore anticipate that the sign of the
coefficient on this variable should be positive.
Our second independent variable is a measure of financial distress for each firm. As a proxy for financial distress we use the change
in the ratio of the company's book value to market value during the
interval between the filing of the suit and the settlement of it. Our
hypothesis is that companies that are in financial distress during the
settlement negotiations will be less able to pay larger settlements.
This leads us to expect a negative coefficient on this term.
14 This intuition is supported by the data in Table 3A below. It shows that the
market capitalization of companies with relatively low settlement amount to provable

loss ratios is much bigger than those with higher ratios.
TABLE

3A.

Mean
Median
Number of observations

PROVABLE

Loss

RATIOS BY MARKET CAPITALIZATION

Ratio of Settlement Amount to
Provable Losses < 2%

Ratio of Settlement Amount to
Provable Losses > 2%

9698.3
1176.6

568.3
155.9

75

277

15 We use a logarithmic transformation of the settlement amount, provable
losses, and total assets of the defendant companies to mitigate the effect of large outliers in the data.
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As the third independent variable we added a measure of firm
size: total asset value. This is defined as current assets plus net property, plant, and equipment plus other non-current assets including intangible assets, deferred charges, and investments and advances.
Once again we do a logarithmic transformation of the variable. Our
hypothesis is that larger companies have greater resources to use in
settling actions, and we therefore expect that the sign of this term will
be positive.
Fourth, we add the length of class period as an independent variable. This variable is measured in months. We include this term as a
measure of the number of defrauded investors. We believe that if
there are more defrauded investors, then the company will be under
more public pressure to increase the amount of the settlement.
Finally, to examine the effect of parallel SEC proceedings on private class action settlements, we augment our regression with a
dummy variable that controls for the presence of an SEC enforcement
action. This dummy variable equals one if a private class action is accompanied by parallel SEC proceedings and zero otherwise.
Table 4 presents our regression results for the entire sample. The
adjusted R-squared for the equation is 55.1%.
TABLE

4.

MULTIVARiATE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE

Dependent Variable: Log (Settlement Amount)

Log (Provable Losses)
Measure of Financial Distress
Log (Total Assets)
Class Period
SEC
Intercept
Adjusted R-squared

0.32
-0.06
0.19

0.04
0.05
0.03

7.23
-1.04
5.57

0.00
0.30
0.00

0.02
0.29
3.70

0.01
0.12
0.38

2.81
2.41
9.82

0.01
0.02
0.00

55.1%

Each of the independent variables has the expected sign and all
of them except financial distress are highly significant. We interpret
these results as consistent with our hypotheses that the absolute dollar
amount of a settlement is increased by the size of estimated provable
losses, the size of the target firm, the length of the class period, and
the presence of an SEC action.
We also estimated this equation with a dummy variable to control
for pre-January 1, 2002, and post-January 1, 2002, to see if settlement
sizes were statistically significantly larger in the latter time period.
However, this variable was insignificant in all of the regressions (re-
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suits not shown). Similarly, we tried various interaction terms to see if
cases with parallel SEC actions had different characteristics than those
without such cases, but all of these terms were statistically
insignificant.
C.

MultivariateAnalysis of Determinants of SEC Enforcement Actions

The last empirical question we ask is: what are the factors that
lead the SEC to file an enforcement action? In our prior work, using
a similar set of independent variables to those in Part II.B. above, we
found that the only statistically significant determinant for SEC filing
decisions was financial distress. Table 5 below revisits that question
with our expanded sample that includes post-2001 settlements of SEC
enforcement actions. Because the dependent variable is discontinuous, we use a probit analysis.
Our first four independent variables are provable losses, financial
distress, market capitalization, and class period. These independent
variables are defined as previously. We expect that larger provable
losses will increase the likelihood of the SEC filing an enforcement
proceeding as it tries to target bigger frauds. Our second hypothesis is
that the SEC will also target financially distressed firms because it is
very concerned about highly visible fraud at these companies that will
have a high likelihood of hurting investors. For market capitalization,
we are unsure what sign to expect because while the SEC could
choose to go after larger companies that are more visible, it might also
prefer to go after weaker targets. Finally, we expect a positive sign on
the class period variable as a longer class period will mean a larger
potential number of defrauded investors, which should make it more
likely that the SEC will file an action.
To test for differences in SEC enforcement strategies between the
pre-January 1, 2002, time period and post-January 1, 2002, we include
time dummy variables for each independent variable as well as a separate dummy to pick up changes in the overall level of enforcement
activity. We do so because our bi-variate analysis led us to suspect that
the SEC changed its targeting techniques in the later time period.
For the pre-January 1, 2002, time period, we find that financial
distress is the only statistically significant predictor of SEC enforcement actions. This is consistent with the results in our earlier work.
We interpret this to mean that prior to January 1, 2002, the SEC was
most concerned with fraud at companies experiencing financial distress, probably because of the greater likelihood that investors at those
companies would suffer permanent and irreversible losses. It could
also reflect a potential preference by the SEC to choose weak
opponents.
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Dependent Variable: SEC

-0.04
1.83

0.08
0.55

-0.53
3.35

0.60
0.00

0.19
-0.16

0.10
0.13

1.89
-1.22

0.06
0.22

-0.02
-0.10

0.02
0.04

-0.94
-2.57

0.35
0.01

0.02
0.00

0.01
0.02

1.31
-0.18

0.19
0.86

Time Dummy
Intercept

0.06
-1.04

0.43
0.22

0.14
-4.66

0.89
0.00

McFadden R-squared

10.8%

Provable Losses
Provable Losses * Time Dummy
Measure of Financial Distress
Measure of Financial Distress *

Time

Market Capitalization
Market Capitalization * Time Dummy
Class Period
Class Period * Time Dummy

Dummy

A very different pattern shows up in the post-January 1, 2002,
dummy variables. We see that the time dummy variables for provable
losses and market capitalization are statistically significant, although
the sign of the market capitalization variable is negative. We interpret
these findings to indicate that the SEC prefers targets where shareholders have suffered greater provable losses with a bias toward selecting smaller firms.
CONCLUSION

Our results are consistent with the view that there was a shift in
the targeting of SEC enforcement actions after the end of 2001. We
find that the SEC seems to have shifted its enforcement focus away
from challenging frauds at firms in financial distress to seeking out
frauds at companies where investors may have suffered larger losses,
especially if they are smaller firms. This shift could be due to numerous factors. First, the national elections in 2000 ushered in not only a
new set of commissioners but also a new Director of Enforcement at
the SEC. These changes may well have influenced the case selection
that led to settlements studied in our post-2001 cohort of settlements.
Second, public concern about fraudulent practices at the largest corporations could well have provided impetus for the SEC's enforce-

ment staff to involve itself with more "high profile" cases than it
otherwise would have engaged.
We also add a note of caution about our interpretation of our
findings about SEC enforcement targeting. These results are based
on dates of settlements and not on the date the SEC began its enforce-

2005]

HAVE

THINGS

CHANGED

SINCE ENRON?

ment investigation of a company. We have focused on the dates of
settlements because there frequently is little information as to when
the SEC has commenced its investigation since its initial investigations
lack the formality of public authorization by the commissioners.
Thus, there is no accurate way available to us to determine when the
SEC first began its investigation that ultimately led to the sanction being imposed on the respondent in that action. We nevertheless are
comfortable that most of the cases settled after 2001 would have been
at least initiated in the post-Enron atmosphere and in any case that
the sanctions imposed in 2002 and later were indeed in the shadow of
Enron.
With respect to settlement sizes in private class actions, we find
that provable losses, total assets, class period, and the presence of an
SEC enforcement action are all positively and significantly related to
the dollar amount of the settlement obtained in a private action.
These effects do not change over the time period of our sample. The
fact that provable losses are such an important determinant of the size
16
of actual recoveries supports the view that the "merits do matter."'

16 Compare Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 500 (1991), who claims that all securities
fraud cases in her sample settled for approximately "one quarter of the potential damages ... [so that] a strong case in this group appears to have been worth no more
than a weak one." Id.
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